We present adaptively-secure efficient solutions to several central problems in the area of threshold cryptography. We prove these solutions to withstand adaptive attackers that choose parties for corruption at any time during the run of the protocol. In contrast, all previously known efficient protocols for these problems were proven secure only against less realistic static adversaries that choose and fix the subset of corrupted parties before the start of the protocol run.
Introduction
Distributed cryptography has received a lot of attention in modern cryptographic research. It covers a variety of areas and applications, from the study of secret-sharing schemes, to the distributed computation of general functions using secure multi-party protocols, to the design and analysis of specific threshold cryptosystems. Two main goals that motivate this research area are: (i) provide security to applications that are inherently distributed, namely, several parties are trying to accomplish some common task (e.g., secure elections, auctions, games) in the presence of an attacker, and (ii) avoid single points-of-failure in a security system by distributing the crucial security resources (e.g. sharing the ability to generate signatures). In both cases the underlying assumption is that an attacker can penetrate and control a portion of the parties in the system but not all of them.
Coming up with correct protocols for meeting the above goals has proven to be a challenging task; trying to design protocols that are practical as well as fully-analyzed is even more challenging. One inherent difficulty in the analysis of cryptographic systems, in general, is the need to define a mathematical model that is strong enough to capture realistic security threats and attacker's capabilities, and which, at the same time, allows to prove the security of sound solutions. Due to the complexity of building and reasoning about distributed protocols, this difficulty is even greater in the area of distributed cryptography. In this case a large variety of security models have been proposed. This is not just due to "philosophical disagreements" on what the best way to model reasonable attackers is, but it is also influenced by our ability (or lack of it) to create protocols for which we can prove security under strong adversarial models.
One major distinction between security models for distributed protocols is whether the attacker is static or adaptive (the latter is also called "dynamic"). In both cases the attacker is allowed to corrupt any subset of parties up to some size (or threshold) as specified by the security model. However, in the case of an adaptive adversary the decision of which parties to corrupt can be made at any time during the run of the protocol and, in particular, it can be based on the information gathered by the attacker during this run. In contrast, in the static case the attacker must choose its victims independently of the information it learns during the protocol. Therefore, the subset of corrupted parties can be seen as chosen and fixed by the attacker before the start of the protocol's run.
The bulk of published works on distributed cryptography assumes a static adversary. This is due to the difficulties encountered when trying to design and prove protocols resistant to adaptive adversaries. However, it is known that protocols can be secure in the static model and still insecure in the adaptive one [CFGN96, CDD · 99, Can98]. Therefore, since the adaptive adversary model appears to better capture real threats, proving protocols secure in the static model is not enough to assume their practical security. Although general constructions have been shown in the adaptive-adversary model for secure distributed evaluation of any polynomial-time computable function [BGW88, CCD88, BH92, CFGN96] , these general results do not provide sufficiently efficient solutions to practical applications like adaptively-secure threshold DSS or RSA signature scheme. Until now, no efficient adaptive solutions for threshold cryptosystems were known.
Our Contribution. The main contribution of this paper is in providing concrete, fully-specified, fully-analyzed solutions to some of the central problems in threshold cryptography, and proving their security in the adaptive adversary model. Our solutions add little overhead relative to existing solutions for the same problems in the static-adversary model. They are also constant-round; namely, the number of rounds of communication is fixed and independent of the number of parties in the system, the input length, or the security parameter. Thus we believe that our protocols are practical and can be of real use in emerging threshold cryptography applications. Very importantly, we provide full analysis and proofs for our solutions. This is essential in an area where simple intuition is usually highly misleading and likely to produce flawed protocols.
Our work introduces general new techniques for the design and analysis of protocols in the adaptive-adversary model. In section 2 we give an overview of these techniques to aid the understanding of the protocols and the proofs given in the following sections. We also hope that these techniques will be applicable to the design of adaptively-secure solutions to other problems.
In section 3 we start the presentation of our protocols with an adaptively-secure solution for the distributed generation of keys for DSS, El Gamal, and other discrete-log based public-key systems (for signatures and encryption). Previous solutions to this problem worked against static adversaries only. Such a protocol is not only needed for generating keys in a distributed way without a trusted party, but it is also a crucial component of many other cryptographic protocols. We illustrate this in our own work by using it for distributed generation of the Ö part in DSS signatures.
In section 4 we present a threshold DSS scheme consisting of the above distributed key generation and an adaptively-secure protocol for the shared generation of DSS signatures. We first show a simplified protocol where the attacker can control up to Ø Ò players. This protocols helps in highlighting and understanding many of our new and basic techniques. Next we describe an optimal-resilience, Ø Ò ¾, threshold DSS scheme.
In section 5 we show how our techniques can be used to achieve adaptively-secure distributed protocols for other public-key systems. We show how to modify existing threshold RSA protocols (proven in the static model) to obtain adaptively-secure threshold RSA. Here also we achieve optimal-resiliency and constant-round protocols. We also show how our techniques allow for "upgrading" existent proactive discrete-log based threshold schemes from the static-adversary model to the adaptive one.
Related Work. Our work builds directly on previous protocols that were secure only in the static-adversary model, particularly on [Ped91b, GJKR99] for the distributed key generation and [GJKR96] for the threshold DSS signatures. We modify and strengthen these protocols to achieve adaptive security. Similarly, our solution to adaptive threshold RSA is based on the previous work of [Rab98] .
As said before, if one is not concerned with the practicality of the solutions then general protocols for secure distributed computation of polynomial-time functions in the presence of adaptive adversaries are known. This was shown in [BGW88, CCD88] assuming (ideal) private channels. Later, [BH92] showed that with the help of standard encryption and careful erasure of keys one can translate these protocols into the model of public tappable channels. Recently, [CFGN96] showed how to do this translation without recurring to erasures but at the expense of a significant added complexity. Other recent work on the adaptive-adversary model includes [Can98, CDD
· 99]. Also, independently from our work, adaptively-secure distributed cryptosystems have been recently studied in [FMY] .
Technical Overview: Road-map to Adaptive Security
This section provides an overview of some basic technical elements in our work. It is intended as a high-level introduction to some of the issues that underly the protocol design and proofs presented in this paper (without getting into a detailed description of the protocols themselves, which are described in the later sections). We point out to some general aspects of our design and proof methodology, focusing on the elements that are essential to the treatment of the adaptive-adversary model in general, and to the understanding of our new techniques. For simplicity and concreteness, our presentation focuses mainly on threshold signature schemes which are threshold solutions to some existing centralized scheme like DSS or RSA. However, most of the issues we raise are applicable to other threshold functions and cryptosystems.
Threshold Signature Schemes. A threshold signature scheme consists of a distributed key generation protocol, a distributed signature generation protocol and a centralized verification algorithm (See the formal definitions in Appendix A). The signing servers first run the key generation, and obtain their private key shares and the global public key. Next, whenever a message needs to be signed, the servers invoke the signature generation protocol. The definition of secure threshold signature scheme makes two requirements. The first is unforgeability, which says, roughly, that, even after interacting with the signing parties in the initial generation of the distributed key and then in the signing protocol invoked on adaptively chosen messages, the adversary should be unable (except with negligible probability) to come up with a message that was not signed by the servers together with a valid signature. The second requirement is robustness, which says that whenever the servers wish to sign a message, a valid signature should be generated. Our model and definitions of Appendix A are a natural adaptation to the adaptive-adversary model of the definitions for threshold signatures found in [GJKR96] , which in turn are based on the notion of security of a regular, centralized, signature scheme against chosen attacks as defined in [GMR88] .
Proofs by Reduction and the Central Role of Simulations. We use the usual "reductionist" approach for the proofs of our protocols. Namely, given an adversary that forges signatures in the distributed setting, we construct a forger that forges signatures of the underlying centralized signature scheme. Thus, under the assumption that the centralized scheme is secure, the threshold signature scheme must also be secure. A key ingredient in the reduction is a "simulation" of the view of the adversary in its run against the distributed protocol.
½ That is, the forger builds a virtual distributed environment where the instructions of are carried out. Typically, first has to simulate to an execution of the distributed key generation that results in the same public key against which stages a forgery. Then will successively invoke the distributed signature protocol on messages of his choice, and , having access to a signing oracle of the underlying centralized signature scheme, has to simulate to its view of an execution of the distributed signature protocol on these messages. Eventually, if outputs a forgery in the imitated environment, will output a forgery against the centralized signature scheme. Two crucial steps in the analysis of this forger are: (1) Demonstrate that the adversary's view of the simulated interaction is indistinguishable ¾ from its view of a real interaction with parties running the threshold scheme. (2) Demonstrate that the forger can translate a successful forgery by the adversary (in the simulated run) to a successful forgery of the centralized signature scheme.
The first step is the technical core of our proofs (see Lemmas 1 and 2). Furthermore, to carry out the second step we need simulators that are able to generate views that are indistinguishable from the view of the adversary under a given conditioning. More specifically, has to simulate a run of the distributed key generation that arrives at a given public key of the underlying centralized scheme, and it has to simulate a run of the distributed signature scheme that arrives at a given signature output by the signing oracle of the centralized scheme. We refer to this as the problem of hitting a particular value in the simulation.
Problems with Simulating an Adaptive Adversary. The above proof technique is also used in the case of static adversaries. However, an adaptive adversary can corrupt any player at any time (as long as not too many parties are corrupted) and at that point the simulator needs to be able to provide the attacker with the current internal state of the broken party. In particular, this information must be consistent with the information previously seen by the attacker. Providing this information is typically the main difficulty in proving adaptive security of protocols. In paragraph "adaptive vs. non-adaptive" of Section 3, we show that a simulation of previous threshold ½ The technique of simulation of adversary's view in a protocol was introduced by [GMR89] . ¾ The notion of computational indistinguishability was introduced in [Y82] and [GM84] . protocols, provably static-resistant, fails in this way in the adaptive setting. This does not necessarily mean that previous solutions are insecure in the presence of an adaptive attacker, but it shows, at least, that current analytical techniques seem insufficient to prove their security in this stronger model.
¿
Here we demonstrate the difficulty of simulating a view of the adaptive adversary with a simplified example taken from the protocol discussed in the aforementioned paragraph: Let Ô Õ be large primes s. values Ü via interpolation in the exponent. Since the simulator cannot predict which servers will be corrupted, the chances that the subset Ì he picks is going to include all the servers which the adversary decides to corrupt are negligible. In contrast, the simulation of such a protocol is possible in the case of a static attacker where the simulator knows in advance the set of corrupted players, because then the simulator simply picks the subset Ì that includes all these players.
Erasures. One way to get around the above problem in the adaptive-adversary model is to specify in the protocol that the servers erase the private values Ü before the values Ü are broadcasted. Now, when corrupting È , this information is not available to the adversary in the real run of the protocol and therefore there is no need to provide it in the simulation. However, this technique can only be applied when the protocol no longer needs Ü .
A careful use of erasures is at the core of the design of our protocols. In some cases, this requires that information that could have been useful for the continuation of the protocol be erased. Two examples of crucial erasures in our protocols are the erasure of some of the verification information kept by Pedersen's VSS protocol [Ped91a] (which we compensate for with the use zero-knowledge proofs -see below), and the erasure of all temporary information generated during each execution of the signature protocol. Furthermore, erasures simplify the task of implementing private channels with conventional encryption in the adaptive model (see below).
Rewinding the Adversary. Another useful technique for getting around the problem of having to present the attacker with information not available to the simulator is rewinding. This is a well-known technique for proving zero-knowledge (and other) protocols. In its essence it allows a simulator that is "in trouble" with its simulation to rewind the adversary's state to a previous computation state, and restart the computation from there. At this point the simulation will try some other random choices in the computation hoping that it will not end in another bad position as before. Thus, in the case where the chances to get "stuck" again are not too large then rewinding is a very useful technique. In a second try, after the simulator makes some different choices, the adversary will hopefully not hit an "inconsistent" situation again.
¿ As mentioned in the introduction, resistance to static adversaries does not imply, in general, resistance to adaptive ones. For example, [CDD · 99] have recently shown that a known protocol is secure against static attackers but is insecure against an adaptive attacker. (Interestingly, this protocol resists even computationally-unlimited static attackers but succumbs to computationally-bounded adaptive attackers.)
In other words, there exists a Ø-degree polynomial ´Þµ s.t. Ü ´ µ ÑÓ Õ for all ¾ ½ Ò and Ü ´¼µ ÑÓ Õ. Therefore, the random values Ü ½ ÜÒ are Ø-wise independent. Successful erasure of data is not a trivial task. Extra precaution is needed to insure that the data, and all its back-ups, are carefully overwritten (one needs to watch out for long-term 'residual memory' of magnetic storage media, for untrustworthy operating systems, etc). In our setting, we trust uncorrupted parties to properly erase data whenever required by the protocol. This is somewhat similar to the requirement that parties erase Diffie-Hellman exponents to achieve perfect forward secrecy [DOW92] . (See [CFGN96, Can98] for further discussion on the issue of data erasures.)
Note that rewinding is a proof technique, not a protocol action. Yet, one has to design the protocol in ways that make rewinding a useful tool. As in the case of erasures, correct use of rewinding requires care. Following is an important instance where an improper use of rewinding can render the whole simulation useless. Assume that the distributed adversary asks for signatures on a sequence of messages Ñ ½ Ñ ¾ . For each message Ñ , in order to simulate the signature protocol, the forger must ask the signing oracle of the underlying centralized signature scheme for a signature on Ñ . Assume now that during the Ø signature protocol (while simulating the distributed signing of message Ñ ) the simulator gets "stuck" and needs to rewind the adversary back to a previous signature protocol, say the Ø one for . Now the adversary is rewinded back to Ñ , the subsequent view is different, so with all likelihood the adversary will start asking for signatures on different messages. forgery, but such event will not count as a success for the forger .
It is important then to confine rewinding of the adversary inside a simulation of a single run of the signature protocol. That is, the simulator must not be allowed to rewind an adversary to a previous signature protocol. One of the tools that we use to ensure that our protocols are simulatable in such a way is the erasure of local temporary information generated by our protocols.
The Single-Inconsistent-Player Technique. Another concern that needs to be addressed is making sure that rewindings do not take place too often (otherwise the simulator may not run in polynomial time). Very roughly, we guarantee this property as follows. We make sure that the simulator can, at any point of the simulated run of the protocol, present the attacker with a correct internal state (i.e. state that is consistent with the attacker's view) for all honest players except, maybe, for one server. This server is chosen by the simulator at random among the currently non-corrupted servers. Moreover, the view of the attacker is independent from this choice of the simulator. This guarantees that the inconsistent server is corrupted (which forces the simulator to stop and rewind the simulation) with probability at most one half (this probability is given by the ratio Ø Ò of corrupted players). Thus, the expected number of rewindings is at most one. In the "Adaptive vs. Non-Adaptive Solutions" paragraph of Section 3, we show how we used this technique in our protocols. Namely, we show that the crucial modification which created an adaptively-secure key generation protocol from a previous protocol of [GJKR99] which was secure in only the static-adversary model, was the reduction of the number of "inconsistent" players to only one.
Zero-Knowledge to the Rescue, and Efficiently. We have explained the importance of having during simulation at most a single player with possible inconsistent internal state. In our protocols, this property is achieved, to a large extent, using erasure of internal information by the players that otherwise could create inconsistencies with the attacker's view. Usually, the erased information was useful for verifying future actions by other players, and thus its erasure forces us to find other ways for verification of these actions in the protocol. We turn for this task to zero-knowledge proofs [GMR89] , and more specifically to zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge.
Useful as they are, zero-knowledge proofs may add significant complexity to the protocols, degrade performance, and increase communication. We show how to make intensive use of zero-knowledge proofs with significant savings in complexity. Specifically, we show how to achieve the effect of Ç´Ò ¾ µ zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge (where each of the Ò players proves something to each of the other players) in a single 3-move honest verifier zero-knowledge proof. This is done by implementing the honest verifier using a distributed generation of a challenge by all players. We implement this technique for Schnorr's proof of possession of discrete-log [Sch91] ; the same technique can be used for other zero-knowledge protocols as well [CD98] .
Maintaining Private Channels in the Adaptive
Model. An important observation about the design of our protocols is that we specify them using the abstraction of "private channels" between each pair of parties. This
We remark that the rewinding technique may also cause difficulties when the signature protocol is composed with other protocols, and in particular when several copies of the signature protocol are allowed to run concurrently. We leave these issues out of the scope of this work. See more details in [DNS98, KPR98] .
Recall that 3-move zero-knowledge proofs cannot exist for cheating verifiers if the underlying problem is not in BPP [GK96, IS93] . Thus, the distributed nature of the verifier in our implementation is essential for "forcing honesty". In particular, our simulation of these proofs does not require rewinding at all. is a usual simplifying approach in the design of cryptographic protocols: The underlying assumption is that these private channels can be implemented via encryption. In the case of adaptive security, however, this simple paradigm needs to be re-examined. Indeed, a straightforward replacement of private channels with encryption could ruin the adaptive security of our protocols. Fortunately, in settings where data erasures are acceptable (and in particular in our setting) a very simple technique exists [BH92] for solving this problem. It involves local refreshment of (symmetric) encryption keys by each party, using a simple pseudorandom generator and without need for interaction between the parties. This adds virtually no overhead to the protocols beyond the cost of symmetric encryption itself.
Adaptively-secure Distributed Key Generation
A basic component of threshold cryptosystems based on the difficulty of computing discrete logarithms is the shared generation of a secret Ü for which the value Ü is made public. Not only is this needed to generate a shared key without a trusted dealer but it is also a sub-module of other protocols, e.g. as used in our own threshold DSS scheme for generating Ö ½ (see Sec. 4). We call this module a "Distributed Key Generation for Discrete-Log Based Cryptosystems" (DL-Key-Gen) protocol. This primitive is defined in [GJKR99] , yet the solution provided in that paper is proven secure only against a non-adaptive adversary. A DL-Key-Gen protocol is performed by To ensure the ability to use the DL-Key-Gen protocol as a module in a larger, adaptively secure, threshold scheme (like the DSS-ts signature scheme of Section 4) we add to the requirements of [GJKR99] that at the end of the protocol each party must erase all the generated internal data pertaining to this execution of the protocol except of course for its private output Ü . This requirement ensures that the simulator of the threshold scheme within which DL-Key-Gen is used as a module (e.g. DSS-Sig-Gen and the DSS-ts scheme as a whole, see section 4) is able to produce the internal state of a player whom the adversary corrupts after the execution of the DL-Key-Gen module is completed.
Distributed Key Generation Protocol. We present a distributed key generation protocol DL-Key-Gen with resilience Ø Ò ¿, which is simple to explain and already contains the design and analysis ideas in our work. (See Figure 3 below for the modifications required to achieve optimal resilience Ø Ò ¾.) DL-Key-Gen is based on the Distributed Key Generation protocol of [GJKR99] (called DKG there) which is proven secure only against a non-adaptive adversary. (Some of the changes made to this protocol in order to achieve adaptive security are discussed below.) Protocol DL-Key-Gen presented in Fig.1 , starts with inputs´Ô Õ µ where´Ô Õ µ is a discrete-log instance and is a random element in the subgroup of £ Ô generated by . When DL-Key-Gen is executed on inputś Ô Õ µ only (which happens when the DL-Key-Gen is invoked for the first time), a random element in the subgroup of £ Ô generated by , must first be publicly generated as follows: If Õ ¾ does not divide Ô ½, the players For technical reasons, we additionally require that Ô -½ is not divisible by Õ ¾ (however, Ô -½ is divisible by Õ).
Compare Appendix A, where we provide a syntactic definition of distributed key generation Key-Gen. DL-Key-Gen is an example of Key-Gen for specific discrete-log based signature schemes like DSS (Ü 's here are the private outputs × of Key-Gen, and Ý, together with´Ô Õ µ, is the public output Ú). However, in Appendix A we assume that the only input to Key-Gen is a security parameter , while DL-Key-Gen protocol we describe here starts with public values´Ô Õ µ which satisfy specific properties.
However, the definition of security of a threshold signature scheme in Appendix A can be modified so that the distributed key generation protocol Key-Gen starts with more public input than just the security parameter . For example, the security of a DSS scheme (see Appendix C) is claimed for every prime Ô, prime Õ, and generator of specified length. Therefore, the´Ô Õ µ triple can be a public input to DL-Key-Gen, because it can be centrally generated by any party, and its required properties can be verified by all participating players.
However, in general, the´Ô Õ µ values can also be easily publicly generated with randomized procedures that find primes and elements of a given prime order, using randomness jointly generated by the players via a generic coin-flipping protocol ( [BGW88] Thus, if we could have each player "deliver" Þ in a verifiable way then we could compute Ý. To that end, we require È to "split" his commitment ¼ into the two components Þ and ¼ ´¼µ (
Step 2). To ensure that he gives the correct split, È proves that he knows both ÐÓ and ÐÓ with Schnorr's 3-round zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of discrete-log [Sch91] . We exploit the fact that each player is proving his statement to many verifiers by generating a single challenge ½¼ We chose to write DL-Key-Gen with as an additional input, so that it could be invoked as a module by the DSS-ts scheme of Section 4 without generating each time.
for all these proofs. Joint challenge is generated with Joint-RVSS with public reconstruction (Steps 3-4) .
½½ The players then erase all the information generated during the protocol except of their share of the secret key.
Proving Adaptive Security of Key Generation. In Figure 2 we present a simulator SIM-DL-Key-Gen for the DL-Key-Gen protocol.
½¾ This simulation is the crux of the proof of secrecy in the protocol, namely, that nothing is revealed by the protocol beyond the value Ý Ü ÑÓ Ô (to show this we provide the value of Ý as input to the simulator and require it to simulate a run of the DL-Key-Gen protocol that ends with Ý as its public output).
We denote by (resp. ) the set of currently good (resp. bad) players. The simulator executes the protocol for all the players in except one. The state of the special player È (selected at random) is used by the simulator to "fix" the output of the simulation to Ý, the required public key. Since the simulator does not know ÐÓ Ý it does not know some secret information relative to this special player (in particular the component Þ È that this player contributes to the secret key). This lack of knowledge does not disable the simulator from proving that it knows È 's contribution (Steps 2-6 in DL-Key-Gen) since the simulator can utilize a simulation of this ZK proof. However, if the adversary corrupts È during the simulation (which happens with probability ½ ¾) the simulator will not be able to provide the internal state of this player. Thus, the simulator will need to rewind the adversary and select another special player È ¼ . The simulation will conclude in expected polynomial time. Proof: First we show that SIM-DL-Key-Gen outputs a probability distribution which is identical to the distribution the adversary sees in an execution of DL-Key-Gen that produces Ý as an output. In the following denote by the subgroup of £ Ô generated by . 3. Here SIM-DL-Key-Gen performs a Joint-RVSS´Øµ protocol on behalf of the players in exactly as in the protocol. Thus the view in this step is identical.
4. In this step SIM-DL-Key-Gen broadcasts shares £ of a new polynomial £ ´Þµ which is random subject to the constraint that £ ´ µ ´ µ for ¾ and £ ´¼µ . Although these £ 's are not the same values held as shares by the players in the previous step, the view for the adversary is still the same as in the real protocol. This is because the adversary has seen a Joint-RVSS of value ¼ and at most Ø points of the sharing polynomial . It is easily seen that for any other value there is another polynomial that ½½ We use notation Ú EC-Interpolate´Ú ½ ÚÒ µ for public reconstruction of a value through polynomial interpolation with the use of error-correcting codes. If Ú ½ ÚÒ is a set of values, such that at least Ò Ø of them lie on some -degree polynomial ´¡µ, and
´¼µ. The polynomial can be computed using any standard error-correction mechanism, e.g. the Berlekamp-Welch decoder [BW] . In our applications it will be either Ø (Steps 4 and 7, Figure 1 ) or ¾Ø (Steps 1e and 2, Figure 4) .
½¾ If the simulator simulates the first execution of DL-Key-Gen when it is invoked on Ô Õ only, and no , the simulator needs to simulate the view of the -generation. It does it by simply playing the part of the honest players in that protocol.
Input: public key Ý and parameters´Ô Õ µ and an element generated by [ If is not passed as an input (simulation of first execution of DL-Key-Gen):
Perform the -generation protocol on behalf of the players in . ]
1. Perform
Step 1 of DL-Key-Gen on behalf of the players in . At the end of this step the set ÉÍ Ä is defined. We have shown that the public view of the adversary during the simulation is identical to the one he would see during a real execution. Now we must proceed to show that the simulator can produce a consistent view of the internal states for the players corrupted by the adversary . Clearly, if a player is corrupted before Step 2, the simulator can produce a consistent view because it is following the protocol. After Step 2 the simulator can show correct internal states for all the players in except for the special player È . Thus, if È is corrupted the simulator rewinds the adversary to the beginning of Step 2 and selects at random a different special player. Notice that if a player È in Ò È is corrupted after Step 4, the simulator has broadcasted for È a "fake" value £ . But since we erased all the private information (except the shares) generated in Joint-RVSS in Step 3, the simulator can simply claim that £ was really the share held by È . This will not contradict any of the generated public information. ¾ Notice that at the end of the protocol the simulator erases all the secret information generated during this protocol aside from Ü . Thus if a player in (including the special player È ) is corrupted after Step 9 the simulator simply provides the adversary with Ü and claims that all the rest of the information has been erased.
Key Generation with Optimal Resilience.
We describe the changes required to achieve an optimally-resilient (i.e. Ò ¾Ø · ½) DL-Key-Gen protocol in Figure 3 . The modification described in item 2 of that figure must be reflected in the simulator, because the current SIM-DL-Key-Gen is unable to produce in Step 4 the random 1. The generation of which occurs when DL-Key-Gen is executed for the first time is performed with an adaptively-secure VSS with an optimal Ø Ò ¾ resilience (e.g. [CDD 2. In DL-Key-Gen of Figure 1 , we publicly reconstruct a value created with Joint-RVSS protocol (see Steps 3-4). This reconstruction is done using error-correcting codes, which makes the protocol easy to simulate, but which tolerates only Ø Ò ¿ faults. However, we can achieve optimal resilience by sieving out bad shares with Pedersen verification equation (Eq.(1)) if the players broadcast in Step 4 the associated random values, together with their shares, generated by the Joint-RVSS of the previous step. Therefore the players must no longer erase these values as in the current Step 3.
3. In
Step 9 the players erase all their secret information but their shares Ü as before, except that they hold on also to the associated random values Ü ¼ . Adaptive vs. Non-Adaptive Solutions. As noted before, DL-Key-Gen is based on the recent distributed key generation protocol of [GJKR99] , which is secure only against a static adversary. The generation of Ü is the same in both protocols but they differ in the method for extracting the public key. In the current protocol each player reveals only values´ µ ´ ´¼µ ¼ ´¼µ µ from the execution of Joint-RVSS, and uses zero-knowledge proofs to guarantee that these values are properly formed. Due to this limited revealing of information it is sufficient for the simulator to "cheat" with respect to the internal state of only a single player, and yet to "hit" the desired value. However, in the protocol of [GJKR99] , each player reveals by publishing all values , ¼ Ø. For one of the players the simulator has to commit in this way to a polynomial without knowing ¼ ´¼µ. Therefore he can do it in a way that is consistent with only Ø points on this polynomial. Thus, the simulator has an inconsistent internal state for Ò Ø players, and hence has to stop and rewind every time one of them is corrupted, which happens with overwhelming probability if the adversary is adaptive.
Adaptively-secure Threshold DSS Signature Scheme
As described in Section 2, a Threshold Signature Scheme consists of a distributed key generation, distributed signature protocol, and a signature verification procedure (see full definitions in Appendix A). Here we present an adaptively-secure Threshold DSS Signature Scheme (see Appendix C for the description of a regular, centralized DSS signature scheme). We first present a distributed DSS signature protocol DSS-Sig-Gen with Ø Ò resilience. Then we prove the unforgeability and robustness of the resulting Threshold DSS Signature Scheme DSS-ts which is combined from DL-Key-Gen of Section 3, DSS-Sig-Gen, and the regular DSS verification procedure which we will here denote DSS-Ver. Finally we describe how the optimal-resilient (Ø Ò ¾) version of this signature protocol and the resulting DSS signature scheme. We refer the reader to Section 2 for a higherlevel description of the basic elements in our approach, solutions, and proofs.
Distributed Signature Protocol. The basis for the signature protocol DSS-Sig-Gen (Fig.4) is the protocol of [GJKR96] (see that paper for the full rationale of this protocol), with modifications to allow for the adaptive adversary. Protocol DSS-Sig-Gen assumes that the signing parties have previously executed the DL-Key-Gen protocol and hold the shares Ü of a secret key that corresponds to the generated public key Ý. It also assumes that the public input includes Ô Õ , all generated before DL-Key-Gen started.
The protocol DSS-Sig-Gen is invoked every time some message Ñ needs to be signed. This computation is very similar to the distributed key generation protocol, aside from the complication that it requires to be raised to the inverse of the shared secret value . We achieve this with a variation of the distributed (Steps 1d-1e). The value × is publicly reconstructed when each player reveals the product ´Ñ · Ü Öµ which lies on a ¾Ø-degree polynomial whose free term is × ´Ñ · ÜÖµ. In order to hide all partial information during the public reconstruction of values and × (Steps 1e and 2), we use the Joint-ZVSS subprotocol (see Section B, also Figure 7 ) twice to generate two randomizing polynomials (Step 1b) that are added to the polynomials that secret-share and × respectively. As in DL-Key-Gen, it is crucial for the proof of adaptive security that the players erase at the end all secret information generated by this protocol.
Proving Adaptive Security of Threshold DSS. We state the claim about the security (see definitions of security in Appendix A) of the threshold signature (ts) scheme DSS-ts ( DL-Key-Gen, DSS-Sig-Gen, DSS-Ver ):
Theorem 1 If DSS is unforgeable under adaptive chosen message attack then DSS-ts is a secure (unforgeable and robust) Ø-threshold ts scheme for Ø Ò .
Proof: This follows from the unforgeability and robustness lemmas (Lemma 3 and 4) which we prove below. Note that if DSS is unforgeable under adaptive chosen message attack then in particular computer discrete logarithms is hard, and Lemma 4 follows.
¾
To prove unforgeability, we first need a lemma about the simulator SIM-DSS-Sig-Gen presented in (c) It has been proved that the simulator SIM-DL-Key-Gen outputs the desired distributions for the DL-Key-Gen protocol. Notice also that ¬ is uniformly distributed in (the same as in the real protocol).
(d) Here the simulator broadcasts values Ú £ which were not computed according to the protocol. Yet because these shares have been chosen at random under the condition that they interpolate to a random free term and the polynomial interpolated by them matches the shares held by the adversary, the view of the adversary is exactly the same as in the real protocol.
Generation of ×:
The same argument as above applies to the values × £ .
The discussion about the internal states presented by the simulator to the adversary when a player is corrupted is identical to the one in the proof of Lemma 1. It is important to notice that the only rewinding happens during the simulation of the DL-Key-Gen subroutine inside this protocol. It should be restated here that once the DL-Key-Gen simulator completes its execution the adversary can now corrupt any of the players, including the "special" player, because now even for that player the simulator has a consistent view.
¾
Lemma 3 If DSS is unforgeable under adaptive chosen message attack then DSS-ts is an unforgeable Ø-threshold ts scheme for Ø Ò .
Proof: Assume that DSS-ts is not unforgeable. Then there exists a Ø-threshold adversary s.t. after participating in the initial execution of DL-Key-Gen and then in the repeated execution of DSS-Sig-Gen on messages Ñ ½ Ñ ¾ of 's choice, with a non-negligible probability outputs a valid DSS (message,signature) pair
Ç Ë that provides DSS signatures under the given public key´Ô Õ Ýµ.
fixes the random coins of . First plays the part of the honest parties in the -generation protocol on input´Ô Õ µ. Then runs an interaction between SIM-DL-Key-Gen and on input´Ô Õ Ýµ. By lemma 1, the simulation ends in expected polynomial time and receives a view that is identical to 's view of a random execution of DL-Key-Gen that outputs Ý. When requests a signature on message Ñ , submits Ñ to Ç Ë and receives´Ö × µ, a random DSS signature on Ñ . Then runs an interaction between SIM-DSS-Sig-Gen and on SIM-DSS-Sig-Gen's input´Ô Õ Ý Ñ ´Ö × µµ. By lemma 2, this simulation ends in expected polynomial time and receives a view that is identical to 's view of a random execution of DSS-Sig-Gen on input´Ô Õ Ý Ñ µ that outputs´Ö × µ. Finally, since its views of this simulation are indistinguishable from the real ones, outputs a valid DSS signature´Ñ ´Ö ×µµ where Ñ Ñ for all . outputs this´Ñ ´Ö ×µµ which is a successful existential forgery since never asked its oracle this message Ñ.
Lemma 4 Assuming the computation of discrete logarithms modulo Ô is hard, DSS-ts is a Ø-threshold robust ts scheme for Ø Ò .
Proof: Assume that DSS-ts is not Ø-robust. Then there exists an adversary ¼ s.t. with a non-negligible probability, after ¼ participates in the initial execution of DL-Key-Gen and then in the repeated execution of DSS-Sig-Gen on messages Ñ ½ Ñ ¾ of 's choice, the signing servers fail to produce a valid signature´Ö ×µ on some Ñ under the public key´Ô Õ Ýµ produced by DL-Key-Gen. Using such adversary ¼ , we show how to construct an extractor , a probabilistic polynomial time machine which on input´Ô Õ µ where´Ô Õ µ is a DSS instance and is a random element in the subgroup of £ Ô generated by , outputs ÄÇ ´ µ. In other words, such would compute discrete logarithm on random instances modulo Ô.
On input´Ô Õ µ, first simulates the -picking protocol on inputs´Ô Õ µ to ¼ s.t. this protocol ends with . Then fixes the random coins of ¼ and runs an execution of DL-Key-Gen on behalf of the good players. After that, whenever ¼ submits messages 'sign Ñ ' for signature, runs DSS-Sig-Gen on behalf of the currently good players. During this execution of both the initial DL-Key-Gen and the later instances of DSS-Sig-Gen, turns over players to ¼ according to the latter's corruption requests.
We argue that if ¼ can disrupt -th instance of DSS-Sig-Gen from producing a valid signature then can "catch" ¼ on cheating. More specifically, let Ý be the public output of the above execution of the DL-Key-Gen protocol. The only way that the -th instance of DSS-Sig-Gen above can fail to produce a pair´Ö × µ s.t.
DSS-Ver´´Ô Õ Ýµ Ñ ´Ö × µµ Ô ×× is if ¼ manages one of the following:
(1): Some corrupted player È cheats in one of the Joint-RVSS (or Joint-ZVSS) protocols that the servers perform in the initial DL-Key-Gen or in the -th instance of DSS-Sig-Gen. I.e. the shares player È distributed pass the verification equation 1 (see Figure 7 ), but they do not lie on a Ø-degree polynomial.
(2): Some corrupted player È publishes´ £ £ µ ´ µ in Step 2, and then passes the zero-knowledge proof of possession of discrete logarithm, in Steps 2-5, during the initial DL-Key-Gen (Figure 1) , or when the code of DL-Key-Gen is invoked in the -th instance of the DSS-Sig-Gen (step 1c, Figure 4 ).
On the other hand, whenever ¼ manages one of the above, can detect it: In case (1), sees all the shares of the uncorrupted players, and so it detects if they do not lie on a Ø-degree polynomial. In case (2), if È broadcasts £ ´¼µ , can detect it by reconstructing ´Þµ. When that happens, stops the protocol and computes the discrete logarithm Ä ´ µ ÑÓ Ô in two ways, corresponding to the two ways ¼ was cheating: Figure 4 can be modified to achieve an optimally resilient adaptively-secure DSS signature generation protocol. Such protocol, together with the optimally-resilient version of DL-Key-Gen presented at the end of Section 3, leads to an optimally-resilient version of the Threshold DSS Signature Scheme DSS-ts. The modifications of DSS-Sig-Gen we present here are based on the statically-secure optimal-resilient DSS protocol of [GRR98] .
The first obstacle to achieve optimal fault-tolerance is the use of error-correcting codes which tolerate only Ø Ò ¿ faults. This is the same problem as we had in DL-Key-Gen, and we follow here the same recipe that gave us an optimally-resilient DL-Key-Gen, i.e. we use Pedersen's verification equation to sieve-out bad shares.
The other reason for non-optimal fault-tolerance in DSS-Sig-Gen in Figure 4 is that polynomials of degree ¾Ø are explicitly reconstructed. This seem to imply that even using Pedersen-based sieving of bad shares (rather than error-correcting) the number of points needed is at least ¿Ø · ½. There is however a way to avoid direct interpolation of polynomials of degree ¾Ø when reconstructing product values (as shown in [BGW88] and in a more efficient way in [GRR98] ). For example, during Step 1 in Figure 4 the players have to compute the product where are shared among them. Instead of directly reconstructing the ¾Ø-degree product polynomial, each player È can share Ú the product of its local share using a polynomial of degree Ø (a ZK proof is necessary to enforce that È really shares the correct value). Notice that is a linear combination of ¾Ø · ½ of the Ú 's. Thus can be reconstructed as the free term of a linear combination of ¾Ø · ½ of the sharing polynomials which is a polynomial of degree Ø.
The only complication left to deal with is how to recover the points of bad players that would not behave properly during the protocol. Say that È ½ is bad. It is possible for the other players to recover ½ and ½ in the clear by computing a linear combination of the other shares they hold. To expose È ½ each player È shares (similarly for ) among the other players using Pedersen's VSS (adding a ZK proof that he is sharing the correct value). This "double-sharing" serves as a sort of back-up of the shares and it is used to expose the shares of players that are clearly bad. Indeed to reconstruct ½ it is sufficient that at least Ø · ½ good players broadcast the appropriate linear combination of the shares they received from the back-up sharing. The full protocol is described in Figure 6 .
Further Applications
The techniques introduced in this paper enable us to achieve adaptive security for other threshold public-key systems. Here we sketch our solution to Adaptive Threshold RSA and Adaptive Proactive Solutions.
Adaptive Threshold RSA. We can achieve an adaptively-secure Threshold RSA Signature Generation protocol (but without distributed key generation) with optimal resilience. Furthermore, our protocol runs in a constant number of rounds. We build our solution on the Threshold RSA solution of [Rab98] . The protocol of that paper needs to be modified to use a Pedersen VSS wherever a Feldman VSS is used, the zero-knowledge proofs which appear need to be modified accordingly, and commitments should be of the Pedersen form.
The most interesting change required in this protocol is due to the following: If the current protocol is invoked twice on two different messages, each player gives its partial signature on these messages under its fixed partial key. But as we have seen in Section 2, the simulator is not allowed to rewind back beyond the current invocation of the signature protocol that it is simulating. Clearly, the simulator cannot know the partial keys of all players. If a player for whom he does not know the partial key is broken into during the simulation of the signing of the second message, then the simulator would need to explain both partial signatures of that player, and hence would be forced to rewind beyond the current invocation of the signature protocol.
To avoid this problem, the partial keys need to be changed after each signature generation. This is achieved in a straightforward manner (though it adds a performance penalty to the protocol).
Input: message Ñ to be signed, plus the outputs of (the optimally-resilient) DL-Key-Gen Public Output:´Ö ×µ the signature of the message Ñ (for some randomizers ) are public. È is required to prove in ZK that the value committed to in « (resp. ¬ ) is the same as the value committed to in (resp. AE ). This is done using a zero-knowledge proof from [CD98] . This is a 3-move public coin proof and it is performed by all players together computing the challenge as in Steps 3-4 of (the optimally-resilient) DL-Key-Gen. Ignore those that fail this step. At least Ø · ½ good players will pass it. is the product of the values committed to in « and ¬ . This is done using a zero-knowledge proof from [CD98] . This is a 3-move public coin proof and it is performed by all players as above.
(e) If player È fails the proof in the above step, his shares are publicly reconstructed via interpolation of the back-ups of shares distributed in Step 1c. Since each (resp. ) can be computed as a linear combination of some Ø · ½ values (resp. ) that were properly shared in Step 1c, each player broadcasts the appropriate linear combination of its shares of these 's (resp. 's), together with their associated randomness (computed as the same linear combination of the associated randomness generated in Step 1c). Bad values are sieved out using the public commitments of Step 1c, and are reconstructed, and Ú is set to .
(f) The value is a linear combination of the values Ú½ Ú¾Ø·½. Thus it can be computed interpolating the polynomial of degree Ø which is a linear combination of the polynomials used in Step 1d to share Ú½ Ú¾Ø·½. Each player broadcasts its share (together with its associated randomness) of that Ø-degree polynomial, which is itself a linear combination of the shares of Ú½ Ú¾Ø·½ received in Step 1d. For the Ú 's that were exposed in Step 1e, we use the constant sharing polynomial. Bad shares are detected using the public commitments, and is reconstructed. 
A Adaptive Security of Threshold Signature Schemes: Definitions
This section describes the model of computation and defines adaptively secure threshold signature schemes. The definition is similar to the unforgeability definition of Gennaro et. al. [GJKR96] , with natural adaptation to the adaptive model.
The Model of Computation. There are Ò servers È ½ È Ò who implement the distributed "signature service", and an adversary , all of which can be thought of as probabilistic polynomial time interactive Turing machines.
The parties have a security parameter and random inputs Ö Ö ¼ Ö ½ Ö Ò (Ö ¼ for the adversary, Ö for server È ); in addition the adversary has some auxiliary input, Þ, that represents external, prior information. Note that the servers do not have inputs or auxiliary inputs (see Remark 1 below).
We assume a partially synchronous communication network among the servers, which consists of an authenticated broadcast channel as well as ideally secure point-to-point channels between each two servers. The adversary learns the messages sent on the broadcast channel, and can send messages on it. By partial synchrony we mean that the computation proceeds in synchronized rounds, but the communication is only weakly synchronized within the round. More precisely, we model this as follows: In each round, the adversary decides in the adaptive fashion, , based on the informatio known to it so far, which uncorrupted parties to activate and which to corrupt. An adversary is Ø-threshold if it never corrupts more than Ø servers.
When the adversary corrupts a party È , he learns È 's current internal state. Furthermore, from this point on, all messages directed to È become known to the adversary, who also sends messages in the name of È . When the adversary activates a uncorrupted party È , it receives the messages sent to it in the previous round and it generates its messages for this round. Once all the uncorrupted parties were activated, the adversary generates the messages to be sent by the corrupted servers, and the next round of computation can begin.
½¿ This partially synchronous model, where the corrupted parties decide on their messages based on the messages that the uncorrupted parties sent in the same round, is sometimes referred to as the rushing adversary model.
Threshold Signature (ts) Schemes and their
Security. An Ò-server ts scheme is a triple of protocolś Key-Gen Sig-Gen Verµ, a distributed key generation protocol, a distributed signature generation protocol, and a verification algorithm (see a detailed description below). Our notion of security of ts schemes is a natural generalization of the classic notion of existential unforgeability against chosen message attacks [GMR88] . Namely, we require that the adversary should be unable to come up with a valid signature on a message that was not signed by the servers, even after invoking the servers to sign any sequence of adaptively chosen messages (Definition 1). In addition, we require that the signature scheme be robust, i.e. that if the uncorrupted servers participate in the signing protocol then a valid signature should be generated (Definition 2). (We make a simplifying assumption that the uncorrupted servers always agree on which messages are to be signed. See also Remarks 2 and 3 below.) We formalize the three components´Key-Gen Sig-Gen Verµ of a ts scheme as follows: ½ ¯Key-Gen, a key generation protocol, is run by the Ò servers. Each server has a security parameter , random input Ö , and generates a private output × and a public output Ú. Without loss of generality we assume that the public outputs of all the uncorrupted servers are identical and are sent on the broadcast channel.
Sig-Gen, a signature generation protocol, is run by the Ò servers. This protocol is invoked by an adversary when he sends a message of a form 'sign´Ñµ' on the broadcast channel. Each server has then a public input Ñ, its private input × (presumably, × is the servers' private output from a run of the key generation protocol), and its random input Ö . This protocol has only public output, denoted by 'signed´Ñ Ùµ', which contains a signature Ù on message Ñ. Also here we assume that the public outputs of all the uncorrupted servers are identical ½¿ For example, take a simple protocol between players È ½ È ¾ È ¿ , which consists of two computation rounds: In the first round each player È broadcasts its input bit . In the second, each player outputs the xor of the received bits. Suppose that the inputs of the players are ½ ¼ ¼. The ½-threshold adaptive adversary could easily force the output of the uncorrupted players in this protocol to be ¼. For example, could do the following: (1) Activate È ½ and È ¾ , which causes them to broadcast their input bits ½ and ¼; (2) Corrupt È ¿ and learn its input bit ¼;
(3) Since all the uncorrupted parties have been activated, can now decide to broadcast ¼ ¿ ½ as the input bit of È ¿ , and the first round of the computation ends; (4) In the second round, activates players È ½ and È ¾ again, at which point they both receive bits ½ ¼ ½ which were broadcasted in the previous round, and compute ½¨¼¨½ ¼ as their output.
½ In the description of Sig-Gen the adversary is the only user of the signature service implemented by the ts. Such formalization allows for concise definitions of both unforgeability and robustness of a ts scheme, where we assume that the adversary invokes the signature protocol either (or both) to learn to forge signatures, or to try to disrupt the servers from succesfully executing the protocol. and are sent on the broadcast channel.
Ver, a signature verification algorithm, can be run by any party. It takes an input Ú and a pair´Ñ Ùµ. (Presumably, Ú is the public output of a the key generation protocol, Ñ is some message, and Ù is a signature.)
The output is pass/fail.
An adversarial-run of a ts scheme ´Key-Gen Sig-Gen Verµ, with adversary (having auxiliary input Þ) on random input Ö, consists of first running protocol Key-Gen´ Öµ, with the participation of , and random inputs Ö for the parties. Let Ú × × ½ × Ò denote the public and private outputs from Key-Gen, respectively. Next, each time the adversary submits a message 'sign´Ñµ' on the broadcast channel, the servers run Sig-Gen´Ú Ñ × Öµ, ½ with the participation of . We stress that can invoke many copies of protocol Sig-Gen. However, all the invocations of Sig-Gen are assumed to be sequential, i.e. a new invocation does not start until the previous one is completed. The output of this adversarial run of the threshold signature scheme , denoted ÓÙØ ´ Þ Öµ, is the public output Ú of Key-Gen, followed by the concatenation of all the messages of the type 'sign´Ñµ' sent on the broadcast channel by the adversary, and the messages of the type 'signed Ñ Ùµ' sent on the broadcast channel by the parties and the adversary. Let ÓÙØ ´ Þµ denote the distribution of ÓÙØ ´ Þ Öµ where Ö is uniformly chosen from its domain. Now we can formalize the notions of unforgeability and robustness of a ts scheme:
Definition 1 (Unforgeability of ts schemes) A ts scheme ´Key-Gen Sig-Gen Verµ is Ø-threshold unforgeable if for any Ø-threshold adversary , and any auxiliary input Þ, the random variable ÓÙØ ´ Þµ satisfies the following property, except for probability negligible in : If ÓÙØ ´ Þµ contains a message 'signed´Ñ Ùµ', such that Ver´Ú Ñ Ùµ Ô ××, then it contains a message 'sign´Ñµ'. Informally: If the output includes a message 'signed´Ñ Ùµ' with a valid signature Ù on a message Ñ, then this message must have been produced by the distributed signature protocol invoked on message Ñ by a message 'sign´Ñµ' that also appears in the output. In other words, the adversary cannot produce signatures otherwise but by asking the signing servers to do it. I.e., the adversary cannot forge signatures.
Definition 2 (Robustness of ts schemes)
A ts scheme ´Key-Gen Sig-Gen Verµ is Ø-threshold robust if for any Ø-threshold adversary , and any auxiliary input Þ, the random variable ÓÙØ ´ Þµ satisfies the following property, except for probability negligible in : If ÓÙØ ´ Þµ contains a message 'sign´Ñµ' then it also contains a message 'signed´Ñ Ùµ' s.t. Ver´Ú Ñ Ùµ Ô ××. Informally: If the signing servers are asked to sign some message Ñ (i.e. 'sign´Ñµ' appears in the output) then they always produce a valid signature on that message. I.e., the adversary cannot disrupt the signature process.
Definition 3 (Security of ts schemes) A ts scheme is Ø-threshold secure if it is both Ø-threshold robust and Ø-threshold unforgeable.
Remark 1: On the influence of other protocols run by the servers. Our definition of security postulates that, upon corrupting a server, the adversary sees the current internal state of the server; however, only the state of the current execution of the ts scheme is seen. In particular, the adversary does not see internal data that pertains to other protocols that may be in execution at that server.
This simplification of the model is inconsequential in our model. In particular, it can be seen that the proofs of our schemes remain valid (with immediate modifications) even in the case where the adversary receives some additional "auxiliary input" when corrupting a server.
Remark 2: On weaker communication models. Our definition and protocols are presented in a very convenient communication model, where the parties are provided with point-to-point secure channels, as well as an authenticated broadcast channel. Removing the secrecy and authenticity assumptions from the point-to-point channels may be done by using standard message authentication mechanisms, and adaptively secure encryption schemes (e.g., [BH92, CFGN96] , see the last paragraph of Section 2). The authenticated broadcast channel can ½ Presumably, the servers use a different part of the random vector Ö as their source of randomness for the execution of Key-Gen and each instance of Sig-Gen.
